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STENCEL AERO ENGINEERING CORP. 
v. 
UNITED STATES 
~to CA 8 (Gibson, 
~right, Van Pelt--DJ) 
Federal/Civil 
e 
1. Summary. This case presents the same issue as 
) Qeneral Dynamics Corp. v. United States, No. 76-220, November 
5 Conference, p. 3: whether a military contractor has a valid 
action for inde~1ity against the United States under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 28 V.S.C. § 2674, when a ·serviceman is injured 
( ~ in an aircraft constructed by the contractor and negligence of 
( the United States in designs and specifications is alleged. 
2. Facts. John C. Donham, an Air Force Reserve pilot 
assigned for training to the Missouri Air National Guard, was 
seriously injured when he was forced to eject from the F-lOOD 
aircraft that he was piloting. Petitioner was the manufacturer 
of the plane. Donham sued petitioner, the United States, and 
Mills Mfg. Corp., alleging that the "egress life support system" 
had malfunctioned due to the negligence of the defendants. Peti-
tioner filed a cross-claim for indemnity against the United States, 
arguing that the malfunctioning was due to faulty design and 
specifications imposed by the Government and the Government's 
negligent maintenance after it took custody of the plane. 
The district court dismissed both the claim and the cross-
claim. against the United States. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 
135 (1950), held that an injured serviceman cannot proceed directly 
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 
Since Donham could not recover directly from the Government, the 
district court held that petitioner should not be able to recover 
on a claim derived from Donham's claim. It certified the dis-
position of the cross-claim as final under Rule 54(b) , and peti-
tioner appealed to CA 8. 
CA 8 affirmed. It held that the scope of the federal 
government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is a 
question of federal law. Petitioner's claim rested upon two 
distinct relationships: that of the serviceman to the Govern-
ment, and that of the military contractor to the Government. Each 
of those relationships is governed by federal law. Feres, supra, 
established that for the former, and cases such as Ivanhoe Irri-
gation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958), hold that federal 
contracts are governed by federal law. Id. at 289. Thus, the 
fact that Missouri law might permit an indemnity action in a 
situation where the indemnitor would not be liable to the injured 
party is not conclusive. Instead, federal policies must be con-
sulted. 
CA 8 found that the und,erlying policy of Feres dictated 
rejection of petitioner's claim. The FTCA was simply intended to 
permit the application of appropriate state law. Many of the 
special considerations arising from the Government's authority over 
a serviceman also apply to a military contractor. The Government 
has special privileges when it purchases military hardware, and 
the equipment is routinely moved across this country and overseas. 
The fortuity that an accident occurred in one state rather than 
another should not govern the liability of the United States. 
CA 8 then went on to discuss the decisions from other 
circuits, including CA 9's General Dynamics case. In essence, it 
noted that the circuits were confused over the proper role of 
state law in this area, but that most results could be reconciled 
with its own. The court distinguished the cases that relied on 
the admiralty rule, ~' Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 
372 u.s. 597 (1963). 
3. Contentions. Petitioner argues that CA 8's decision 
conflicts with the admiralty cases, such as Weyerhaeuser, supra, 
and the remand in Treadwell Constr. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 







covery, because there is no danger of a disruption of military 
discipline in a contractual suit for indemnification. Petitioner 
argues that the decision below conflicts with CA 9's Genera l 
Dynamics opinion, because that court looked to state law to deter-
mine the government's liability. Most of the remainder of the 
petition is devoted to a discussion of the different results and 
approaches taken by the courts of appeals in the military area 
and the admiralty area. 
4. Discussion. As indicated in the .General Dynamics 
pool memo, this area seems quite confused. CA 8's opinion in 
this case went to some lengths to justify the result reached, so 
this might be a good case to take. On the other hand, if General 
Dynamics is granted this Friday, there would be no need for both 
of the cases to be heard, and this could be held for it. 
TherE: is ? response. ~ ~ y~ . 
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The issue in this case is extremely narrow: whether the 
United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act to 
indemnify a third party for damages paid to servicemen injured in 
activity incident to military service. I don't think the issue is 
all that difficult, and I know for a fact that it is not all that 
interesting.~~ 
The ~oadent in this case makes out a fairly rational and 
logical argument for allowing a third party to seek indemnification 
from the United States in circumstances such as those presented 
here. But on the whole I think the SG really has the better 
position. The stErting point is Feres v. United States, 340 
~ 
U.S. 135. This Court there held that Congress did not intend in 
the Federal Tort Claims Act to subject the United States to suits 
brought by servicemen for injuries incurred incident to military 
service. Given Feres, there is no doubt that the serviceman in 
this case could not sue the United States directly. Unless the 
Court is interested in overruling Feres--which for me is an 
unacceptable option--the Court should go with the SG in this case. 
To hold otherwise would undermine the results which the 
-------------------~,-------------~-----------------Feres Court obviously considered necessary to the effective 
functioning of the military. 
I find the following points of the SG to have considerable 
force: 
(1) Petitioner's theory of the government's liability 
is essent i ally a tort theory; indeed, it is essentially the same 
theory that the serviceman would have to make if he were suing the 
United States directly. Of course, Stencel can point out that its 
---. ~ ,...-.._. -- ... ,...... 
suit is conce~ded with negligence as to it--the manufacturer--
mther than as to the serviceman. But as Stencel really concedes, 
} 
the "character of the negligence of the United States was such as 
to create [Stencel's] liability to JJ the serviceman]." Brief at 
17. 
(2) The reasons for barring the servieman's action apply 
with almost equal force to these third party suits. Significant, 
in my view, is the fact that these third party suits would 
frustrate the limited liability function of the federal compensation 
statute. 
<: ..,. 
(3) As to equitable considerations, I think it is quite 
important to note that this issue of indemnification can be handled 
by contract. Even~ if this Court rules that third party parties 
-'-=' ..... 
cannot seek an "implied" indemnification under the Tort Claims 
Act, parties can insist that the government put an express 
indemnif.ication clause in the ro ntract. They would then have a 
contract claim in the Court of Claims on future injuries. Indeed, 
a ruling on this issue by this Court is only going to influence the 
relative bargaining strength of the parties with respect to 
negotiation of such a clause. 
CONCLUSION: Although Feres has to strain a bit to find an 
exception for servicemen, I think the case was correctly decided. 
To hold for respondent in this case would undermine the benefits 
of the Feres ruling. Go with the SG on this one. 
gene 
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tencel Aero Engineering l . . . 
Corporation Petitioner On Wnt of Certiorari to the 
' ' United States Court of Ap~ 
U 
. dv.S peals for the Eighth Circuit. 
mte tates. 
[May -, 1977] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
·we granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the 
United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U. S. C. § 2674, to indemnify a third party for damages 
paid by it to a member of the Armed Forces injured in the 
course of military service. 
(1) 
On June 9, 1973, Captain John Donham was permanently 
'injured when the egress life-support system of his F-100 
fighter aircraft malfunctioned during a mid-air emergency.1 
Petitioner, Stencel Aero Engineering Corp., manufactured the 
ejection system pursuant to the specifications of, and by use of 
certain components provided by, the United States.2 Pursu-
ant to the Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U. S. C. § 321 et seq., 
made applicable to National Guardsmen by 32 U.S. C. § 318, 
r'aptain Donham was awarded a life-time pension of approxi-
matPiy $1,500 per month. He nonetheless brought suit for 
1 Captam Donham was at the timr assigned for training to the 131st 
TartH·nl Fighter Group, Mis ouri National Guard . 
2 Thr re 18 no rontrac1ual relationship between the United States and 
.:;tpne<'l. St(•twrl rontrarted WJth North Amrriran Rockwrll, the prime 
gm·Prtmwnt eontrartor, to provid(' the F-IOO's pilot eject system. 
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the injury in the Eastern District of Missouri claiming 
damages of $2,500,000. Named as defendants. inter alia, were 
the United States and Stencel. Donham alleged that the 
emergency eject system malfunctioned as a result of "the 
negligence and carelessness of the defendants individually and 
jointly." 
Stencel then cross-claimed against the United States for 
indemnity, charging that any malfunction in the egress life. 
support system used by Donham was due to faulty specifica-
tions, requirements, and components provided by the Fnited 
States or other persons under contract with the tTnited States. 
The cross-claim further charged that the malfunctioning sys-
tem had been in the exclusive custody and control of the 
United States since the time of its manufactur<'. Stencel 
therefore claimed that, insofar as it was negligent at all. its 
negligence was passive, while the negligence of the UnitRcl 
Htates was active. Accordingly it prayed for indemnity as to 
any sums it would be required to pay to Captain Donhan1.·1 
The United States moved for summary judgment against 
Donham, contending that he could not recover under the 
Tort Claims Act against the Government for injuries sustained 
\llCident to military service. Feres v. Un'ited States, :~40 C S. 
135 (1950). The U11ited States further moved for dismissal 
of Stencel's cross-claim. asserting that Feres also bars a11 in-
demnity action by a third party for monies paid to militar·y 
person11el who could not recover directly from the United 
States. 
The District Court granted the Government's motion:;, hold-
mg that Feres protected the United States both from the 
·' Stencel':; indemnity cla.im is ba;;ed upon the Ja,w of Missouri. See, e. g., 
Feinstein v. Edmond Lwingston & Son.s. Inc .. 457 S. W. 2d 789, 792-793' 
(:\lo . 1970), Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Payway l~'eed !lfills, Inc., 338 
S W. :Zd 1 (Mo. 1960) . The FECA, of cour:sc, immfar· a;; it i~ applicable,. 
trxrs the liability of !II(' Umtcd 8tate~ with reference to "tlw law of the· 
place when• the [wrongful] art or om_i,sion Qel·urrr<.!." :28 U, S. C •. 
~- :; l4() (b}. 
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claims of the serviceman and that of the third party.4 Both 
claims were therefore dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Stencel appealed this ruling to the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 5 and that court affirmed. 
F, 2d -. We granted certiorari.6 429 U. S. 958. 
(2) 
In Feres v. United States, supra, the Court held that an on-
duty serviceman who is injured due to the negligence of 
Government officials may not recover against the United 
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. During the same 
Term, in a case involving injuries to private parties, the Court 
also held that the Act permits impleading the Government as 
a third-party defendant, under a theory of indemnity or con-
tribution, if the original defendant claims that the United 
States was wholly or partially responsible for the plaintiff 's 
lllJUry .. United States v. y;ellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 
(1951). In this case we must resolve the tension between 
Feres and Yellow Cab when a member of the armed services 
brings a tort action against a private defendant and the latter 
seeks indemnity from the United States under the Tort Claims 
Still pending in the Di~trict Court i~ Donham's action again~t Stencel 
nnd against Mills Mamtfacturing Corporation, another alleged tortfeasor. 
:; The Di;;trict Court had properly certified its judgment as final pur-
;;uant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b), thereby making immediate appeal 
by Stencel :tppropriate. 
0 The circuits have been far from t~niform in their treatment of this is-
::;ue. The view taken by the Eighth Circuit in this case was first adopted 
by the Ninth Circuit in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379, 
404, cert. dismissed, 379 U. S. 951 (1964), and has been recently reaffirmed 
111 Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 525 F. 2d 489,491 (1976), petn. for 
'l'rt.. filed , 45 U. S. L. W. 31S4. Positions which appear incon;;istent with 
hi;; view have been adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Barr v. United 
~tatl:'s, 464 F 2d 1141, 1143-1144 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1125 
t l973), and by the Fifth Circuit in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd'~ v. 
~ uitl'd States, 51L F . 2d 159, 163 (1975). 
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Act, claiming that government officials were primarily respon-
sible for the injuries. 
Petitioner argues that " [ t] he Federal Tort Claims Act 
waives the Government's iiiJ.munity from suit in sweeping 
language/' United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, at 
547. Petitioner therefore contends that, unless its claim 
falls within one of the express exceptions to the Act, the 
Court should give effect to the congressional policy underly-
ing the Act, which is to hold the United States liable under 
state law principles to the same extent as a similarly situated 
private individual. However, the principles of Yellow Cab 
here come into conflict with the equally well-established doc-
trine of Feres v. United States. It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine the rationale of Feres to determine to what extent, if 
any, allowance of petitioner's claim would circumvent the 
purposes of the Act as there construed by the Court. 
Feres was an action by the executrix of a serviceman who 
had been killed when the barracks in which he was sleeping 
caught fire. The plaintiff claimed that the United States 
had been negligent in quartering the decedent in barracks it 
knew to be unsafe due to a defective heating planV While 
recognizing the broad congressional purpose in passing the Act, 
the Court noted that the relationship between a sovereign and 
the members of its armed forces is unlike any relationship 
between private individuals. 340 U. S., at 141-142. There 
is thus at least a surface anomaly in applying the mandate of 
the Act that "[t]he United States shall be liable ... in the 
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual 
under like circumstances .... " 28 U. S. C. § 2674. Noting 
that the effect of the Act was "to waive immunity from the 
recognized causes of action and ... not to visit the Govern-
1 The Court considered two additional cases involving alleged negligence 
of army officials. Jefferson v. United States, No. 29, and United States v. 
Griggs , No. :n It i~ unnecessary, for present purposes, to detail th~ 
r~u~ t situations invglved in the'ie two case:s. 
·' 
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pension while he is disabled, the amount of general damages 
awarded him will be reduced pro tanto, and hence his claim 
against petitioner. While the contribution of the United 
States bears no direct relationship to the degree of its fault, it 
cannot be disputed that in all cases where a serviceman is 
injured by defective equipment, the potential exposure of the 
manufacturer of such equipment is substantially reduced by 
the military compensation scheme. Depending on the situa-
tion, this may well redound to the benefit or to the detriment 
of a particular manufacturer. In cases such as this, assuming 
the accuracy of petitioner's factual claims, the manufacturer 
may be required to pay monies for which it would not be 
liable if the contribution of the Government were based 
strictly upon degree of fault. However, it is not difficult to 
posit the converse situation, where the manufacturer is totally 
at fault, yet is spared from monetary liability because the 
Government has fully or partially compensated the service-
man by way of pension benefits. While some Government 
contractors no doubt suffer under this scheme, it cannot be 
said that contractors generally are harmed. 
Our second reason for rejecting petitioner's argument is 
that a compensation scheme such as the Veterans' Benefits 
Act serves a dual purpose: it not only provides a swift, effi-
cient remedy for the injured serviceman, but it also clothes 
the Government in the "protective mantle of the Act's limi-
tation-of-liability provisions." See Cooper Stevedoring Co. 
v. Kopke, Inc., 417 U. S. 106, 115 (1974). Given the broad 
~xposure of the Government, and the great variability in the 
potentially applicable tort law, see Feres, 340 U. S., at 142-
143, the military compensation scheme provides an upper 
limit of liability: for the Government as to service-connected 
injuries. To permit petitioner's claim would circumvent this 
limitation. thereby frustrating one of the essential features of 
the Veterans' Benefits Act. As we stated in a somewhat dif-
ferent context concerning the Tort Claims Act: "To permit 
r lwtitioner l to proceed . . here would be to judicially admit 
'76-32l~OPINION 
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at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away 
.at the front door. We do not believe that the [Federal Tort 
Claims] Act permits such a result." Laird v. Nelms, 406 
U.S. 797, 802 (1972). 
Turning to the third factor, it seems quite clear that where 
~he Cl'\.Se concerns an injury sustained by a soldier while on 
duty, the effect of the action upon military discipline is iden-
tical whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly or by 
a third party. The litigation would take virtually the iden-
tical form in either case, and at issue would be the degree of 
fault, if any, on the part of the Government's agents and the 
effect upon the serviceman's safety. The trial would, in 
fither case, involve second-guessing military orders, and 
would often require members of the armed services to testify 
in court as to each other's decisions and actions. This factor, 
too, weighs against permitting any recovery by petitioner 
against the United States. 
We conclude, therefore, thl'l>t the third party indemnity 
action in this case is unavailable for essentially the same 
reasons that the direct action by Donham is barred by Feres. 
The factors considered by the Feres court are largely appli-
cable ip this type of case as well; hence, the right of a third 
party to recover in an indemnity action against the United 
States recognized in Yellow Cab, supra, must be held limited 
by the rationale of Feres where the injured party is a service-
man. Since the relationship between the United States and 
petitioner is based on a commercial contract, there is no basis 
for a claim of unfairness in this result.8 
Accordingly, the judgment qf the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
\ .(' • 8 Since the jirst Circuit case to hold such actions barred by Feres was 
decided in 1964, see n. 5, supra, petitioner no doubt had sufficient notice 
so as to take this risk into account in negotiating its contract for the 
~IJH>r~enc~ eject system. at issu.e b._l)r~, 
;§nprtntt ~att:rf ttf tltt ~th ;§tatta 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
May 25, 1977 
Re: No. 76-321 - Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, "/ 
vi"' 
The Chief Justice 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
May 25, 1977 
Re: No. 76-321 - Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 25, 1977 
Re: 76-321 - Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
May 25, 1977 
I ·~ 
No. 76-321 Stencel Aero v. United States 
Dear chief: 
Please join me. 
., Sincerely, 
.. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
·' 




JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Chief, 
.$5ttprtmt ~onrlo f llft ~it .$5taftg 
'Jifr ag lyinghm, lB. <!}. 21lgt'! ~ ' 
May 25, 1977 
No. 76-321, Stencel Aero Eng. Corp. 
v. United States 
I agree with the result you reach and expect ultimately 
to join your opinion. As presently written, however, the para-
graph beginning at the bottom of page 6 and running through 
the first half of page 7 causes me some concern. 
Do we really know for certain that "to the extent that the 
serviceman receives a substantial government pension while he 
is disabled, the amount of general damages awarded him will 
be reduced pro tanto, ... "? While I am now more than a 
quarter of a century removed from day-to-day exposure to tort 
law, my recollection is that a good many jurisdictions do not 
permit a jury to know of a plaintiff's compensation from other 
sources, e. g., private insurance or workmen's compensation, 
and do not provide for a pro tanto reduction of the damages 
awarded. -- ---
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
-· 
~ltp'rttttt <!Jcnrt of tltt ~inittb ~tat,tll 
z.l'hts~ington. tn. tiJ. 20pJ1.,;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
May 26 , 1977 
Re : 76-321 - Stencel Ae::o v . United States 
Dear Potter : 
The question you raise persuades me that , as 
often happens , the discussion goes beyond the needs 
of the case . The paragraph is not necessary and 
should either be explicated more full y or omitted , 
and I lean to the latter . 
I will be back to you soon . 
! 
Jj~ 
Mr . Justice Stewar t 
Copies t o the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.®upuutt ~ourl of tltt ~ttitth .itaf:tg 
2Jllr&gltingtcn:.tB. ~· 2llc?J.l.~ 
May 27, 1977 
Re: No. 76-321 Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
I 
I, also , am troubled by the paragraph mentioned in 
Potter's letter to you of May 25. If this problem could be 
resolved, I could join your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
-
The Chief Justice 








JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~upTtm:t <!fouri af tqt ~ttitt~ ..§ihtl'Ci 
'J)nlUllp:ttg:hm. 10. <!f. 2llgtJ1,~ 
May 31, 1977 
Re: No. 76-321 - Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
I join your op1n10n as revised in accordance with 
your memorandum of today. 
Sincerely, 
tfC4~-
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.J USTICE WM . .J . B RENNAN, .JR. 
~:upumc <!Jlllttt :of tlrt 'Jllnit.tb .§t<ttts: · 
~asiyington . !9. Qt. 21lgt'l-,:3 
June 1, 1Q77 
RE: NO. 76-321 Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation 
v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you 




.7-i (~ ( 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
.,, 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~upunu Qj:onrlllf t4t ~h ~mug 
~MJrhtgtan.lB. Qj:. 20~JI..;l , 
/ 
June 1, 1977 
No. 76-321, Stencel Aero Eng. Corp. v. U.S. 
Dear Chief, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court,. as recirculated yesterday. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
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